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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL CLEGG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040426-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Clegg's conviction of theft by 
deception pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405. This Court "will conclude that 
the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was 
convicted.'" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1fl8, 10 P.3d 346, 352 (quoting State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Because this issue was not preserved below, it is 
reviewed for plain error. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 11. Alternatively, this issue should be 
reviewed to determine whether defense counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel? Where the claim of ineffective assistance of 
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counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of 
law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App.), cert denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (1994). 
2. Whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on the 
entire statutory definition of theft by deception set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
405; and whether counsel was ineffective for failing to request such an instruction . 
Because this issue was not raised in the trial court, this Court will review it for obvious 
and harmful error. State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103,1J5, 37 P.3d 1099. 
A claim of ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Nonetheless, "ineffective assistance of counsel 
falls on the end of the spectrum subject to de novo review of the ultimate legal question 
of whether the defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). To establish 
a claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: "(1) that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial 
would probably have been different but for counsel's error." Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
3. Whether the trial court committed plain error in his comments to the jury 
concerning his wife's employment at Wal-Mart and in admonishing the defendant in front 
of the jury? This issue was not preserved but should be reviewed for obvious and harmful 
error. State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, fflf 6-7, 4 P.3d 778. 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to 
deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated 
commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to 
a class or group. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Michael Clegg appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fifth 
District Court after he was convicted by a jury of theft by deception, a third degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Michael Clegg was charged by information filed in Fifth District Court on 
December 18, 2001, with theft by deception, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-405 (R.l). On March 14, 2002, an amended information was 
filed which added the statutory enhancement reference (Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
412) in regards to Clegg's two previous convictions (R.24). 
On March 14 and August 12, 2002, a preliminary hearing was held before the 
Honorable James L. Shumate (R.21, 51, 198, 199). At the close of the hearing Clegg was 
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bound-over for trial upon a finding of probable cause (R.49-50; 199: 6, 8). Clegg entered 
a plea of not guilty upon arraignment on October 31, 2002 (R.60). 
On September 8-9, 2003, a jury trial was held under the direction of Judge 
Shumate (R.88-91, 203,204). At the commencement of the trial, Clegg sought a 
continuance in order to have different counsel appear and because he needed more time to 
locate and secure the attendance of a witness. 
Clegg was found guilty by the jury after a four-hour deliberation (R.91, 106). 
On January 30, 2004, Clegg was sentenced to a 60-day diagnostic evaluation at the 
Utah State Prison (R. 122-24). On May 3, 2004, Clegg was sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison (R. 134-36). 
On May 14, 2004, Clegg filed a pro se notice of appeal in Fifth District Court 
(R. 137-40). 
Prior to the first day of the preliminary hearing on August 12, 2002, Judge 
Shumate made the following statement: "Counsel, we all know that my wife works for 
Wal-Mart. It's not a problem, is it?" (R.198: 3). Clegg's counsel at the time, Brenda 
Whiteley, stated "That is not a problem for me, your Honor" (Id.). 
During jury selection on the first day of trial, the following exchange occurred: 
The Court: Do any of you work for Wal-Mart Corporation, either at stores or at 
the distribution center? If you do would you raise your hand? All 
right, I've got a hand. M'am, what's your name? 
Ms. Hyatt: Crystal Hyatt. 
The Court: All right. Ms. Hyatt, I'm going to excuse you right now, and it's not 
unusual. My wife also works for Wal-Mart. She's a pharmacist for 
them right now. But Wal-Mart is involved in this case and so we're 
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excusing anybody who's from Wal-Mart. Thank you, Ms. Hyatt. 
You can go 
(R.203: 8-9). 
At the end of the first day of trial, Judge Shumate admonished the jurors as to their 
responsibilities as jurors outside the courtroom during the pendency of the trial (R.203: 
159-60). During his admonishments, Judge Shumate made the following statement: 
Do any of you have a crying need to go to the Wal-Mart in Washington 
today? I have to go there and pick up my wife from work, but Fm not going to try 
to learn about the case there; I promise you. Please don't do that yourselves 
(R.203: 160). 
During the trial, Clegg would occasionally offer verbal interjections during the 
testimony of other witnesses and also verbally disagreed with his counsel at times. In 
response, Judge Shumate, at one point towards the end of trial stopped the proceedings 
and made the following statement in the presence of the jury: 
Give me just a minute. Mr. Clegg, I have patiently put up with your 
unusual behavior, your untoward behavior, your outbursts, your fighting with your 
Counsel, the miserable display that you have put on while seated there at Counsel 
table. You will now sit quietly and still for the rest of these proceedings. Don't 
make any noises. Don't move your arms or hands. Don't move your head. Be 
still 
(R.204:241). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of John Marketti 
On November 28, 2001, John Marketti was employed by Wal-Mart in their loss 
prevention division (R.203: 56). Marketti trained Wal-Mart personnel on how to detect 
and apprehend shoplifters; and he also investigated theft cases which occurred at the 
stores (R.203: 56-57). As part of the loss prevention division, Marketti would also patrol 
the stores in plain clothes looking for suspicious activity (R.203: 57-58). 
On November 28, 2001, Marketti was in the Washington Wal-Mart (R.203: 57). 
Over the years he worked for Wal-Mart, Marketti had been in this store approximately 
five times (R.203: 78). 
At approximately 7:30 p.m., Marketti was contacted by two-way radio by Andrea 
Henrie-another loss prevention employee-because Clegg "was acting in a suspicious 
manner" in the hardware department (R.203: 57, 58, 59). Marketti responded to that 
department and observed Clegg in the middle of the aisle with another gentleman, Marcus 
Harrelson (R.203: 59-60). For approximately 10 minutes, Marketti-from a distance of 
15-18 feet-observed Clegg "pacing up and down the aisle. He was looking around to the 
left, to the right, to see if there was anybody around. They also had a shopping cart with 
them and he was looking in the cart, and there were already items that were in the cart 
that they had selected. He was kind of shuffling through those" (R.203: 60, 80). 
Marketti then saw Clegg "turn and bend down and pick up a butane torch that was 
in a box" before he opened the box and removed a butane torch head-which is like an 
adaptor that fits on the top of the torch-and placed it in the shopping cart (R.203: 60). 
Clegg then placed the box containing the butane tank back on the shelf or leaned it 
against the shelf R.203: 61,81). After Clegg left the aisle, Marketti pulled the same box 
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from the shelf to verify that the torch head was missing (R.203: 62). The price of the 
butane torch was $12.97 (R.203: 63). 
Marketti and two other employees-including Henrie-followed Clegg for "at least 
an hour" (R.203: 62, 63). Marketti saw Clegg remove a package containing a pressure 
gauge in the automotive department (R.203: 63). The price of the gauge was $14.96 (Id.). 
Clegg "rip[ped] the package open" and put the gauge into the shopping cart before he 
returned the packaging to another part of the shelf and hid it behind some other items 
(Id.). In his original statement to police, Marketti indicated that Clegg put the gauge 
wrapper "back on the shelf (R.203: 82). 
For the next 20 minutes, Clegg continued to "push his cart around the store, go up 
and down aisles multiple times without really looking at anything" (R.203: 64). In 
Marketti's opinion, Clegg kept looking or turning "to look back to see if there was 
anybody watching him or he was being followed. He was just acting in a real paranoid 
manner" (R.203: 64). 
Marketti observed Clegg approach Rainbow Palmer, a cashier (R.203: 64). Clegg 
had other items in his cart including a sprinkler adapter piece (conduit) (R.203: 64). 
Clegg paid $344.66 for the items in his cart including $20.27 that was spent in tax (R.203: 
65). Exhibit 1 is a copy of the receipt (Id.). The receipt does not show either a butane 
torch head, pressure gauge or conduit (Id.). The receipt contains three items priced at 
$2.74 that have a check mark by them (R.203: 65-66). Marketti testified that the 
checkmark "reflects at the point in time when M(R.Clegg got into line, produced a card 
with a price of-it was a price tag of $2.74. Basically he showed that card to the cashier 
and basically held out these items, making gestures that these items were that price for 
each one" (R.203: 66, 92). 
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While Clegg checked out, Marketti observed him from about 10 feet away (R.203: 
87). Marketti acknowledged that the store was busy that day (Id.). Marketti could hear 
some of the conversation at the checkout stand (R.203: 87-88). Marketti heard Clegg 
indicate that he did not want several items (R.203: 88). The cashier voided these 
items-for example seat covers and duck boots-and set them off to the side (R.203: 88-, 
90). Marketti testified that he believed that Clegg was acting in "a paranoid manner" and 
"was trying to confuse the cashier" (R.203: 91). Marketti also testified that Clegg acted 
like someone who was "under the influence of a controlled substance" (Id.). Marketti 
acknowledged that the furtive movements he observed could be the result of ADD 
(R.203: 91-92). 
Marketti testified that Exhibit 2 is a "hang tag" which is a price tag posted by 
merchandise on a shelf that allows customers to see the general price of items (R.203: 66-
67). The price of the items is also marked individually on each item (R.203: 67). 
Marketti testified that Exhibit 2 was recovered from Clegg's shopping cart (Id.). Marketti 
"believe[s]" that Clegg presented the card to the cashier (R.203: 68). The tag refers to a 
multi-purpose glue (Id.). At preliminary hearing, Marketti testified that the tag went to a 
vacuum belt or some type of automotive lubrication oil (R.203: 86; 198: 22, 24). 
Marketti testified that during the preliminary hearing he may not have remembered what 
the card went to and may have just read what it said above the price (R.203: 86). 
Marketti conceded that he may have been "speculating the best I could" (Id.). 
The tag also contains an SKU number which is "a series of numbers that are 
attached to the bottom of what we call a bar code, and when a cashier scans the bar code 
those identical numbers will come up on the register, and it will allow the register to 
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know what the price is for those items" (R.203: 85). The SKU number on the tag appears 
three consecutive times on the receipt with a corresponding price of $2.74 (R.203: 109). 
When Marketti was asked on cross-examination how he knew that Clegg showed 
the tag to the cashier, Marketti responded "Because that was the same price value, the bar 
codes matched what was rang up, and those items were the only items in the bag that it 
could have went to, because we went through every single item that were in the-that was 
in the bags" (R.203: 85-86). 
Marketti testified that Exhibit 3is a photograph he took on November 28, 2001, 
which "shows the butane torch box, it shows the head that was taken out of the box. It 
shows the sprinkler adapte(R. It shows the empty package, and it shows the... air pressure 
gauge. It also shows what the item is that's supposed to have been-gone to this price tag, 
which was used to trick the cashier into ringing these items up using this price" (R.203: 
69). At preliminary hearing, Marketti testified that he "probably took [the photograph] or 
one-a member of our lost prevention people were responsible for taking the picture" 
(R.203: 83; 198: 23). After further questioning on the issue, Marketti testified that he was 
"pretty sure" he took the photograph because when "I looked at the two pictures I 
remembered that I wanted a picture that was actually up a little bit closer, so I'm pretty 
sure I took the photograph" (R.203: 83). 
Marketti testified that Exhibit 4 is a photograph of Clegg that was taken on 
November 28, 2001, "for identification purposes" (R.203: 70). 
After Clegg left the register, Marketti approached the cashier and asked her what 
had transpired (R.203: 71). He was informed that she had rang up Clegg's items and that 
he paid for them with a check (Id.). Marketti testified that it was a third-party business 
check (R.203: 105). 
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Marketti and the other loss prevention employees (Mowry, Henry, Wilm) stopped 
Clegg between the two sets of exit doors (R.203: 71). Marketti identified himself to 
Clegg and informed him that he "needed to discuss with him some discrepancies with 
some merchandise" in his bags (R.203: 72). 
Marketti then escorted Clegg to the loss prevention office (R.203: 72). The 
pressure gauge, sprinkler conduit and butane torch head were removed from the bags and 
brought into the office (R.203: 73). Marketti assisted Bill Mowry in matching items in 
the bag with the receipt but "at no place on the receipt could we find those that those 
three items were rang at their proper price" (R.203: 74). However, three items were 
priced sequentially at $2.74 (Id.). 
Marketti informed Clegg that he was being "detained" for information while the 
authorities were contacted (R.203: 75). Marketti testified that he tried to keep Clegg 
"calm" because he was "acting in an argutive manner, almost to the point where we had 
to handcuff him" (Id.). 
Approximately 20 minutes later, Officer Pectol arrived at the store (R.203: 75). 
Marketti explained to Pectol "what I had observed or what the situation was, that 
basically these items were not correctly rang up, and that he had tricked the cashier and 
told the cashier that these items were for what was on the card" (R.203: 77). 
Exhibit 5 is a video surveillance tape which shows a still shot of checkout number 
23 approximately every 15 seconds (R.203: 94). It contains no sound (R.203: 95). 
Both Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3 were maintained in the loss prevention file prior to 
trial (R.203: 70). 
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B. Testimony of Rainbow Palmer 
Rainbow Palmer testified that she is from Washington County and was employed 
at Wal-Mart as a cashier on the night of November 28, 2001 (R.203: 113-14). She had 
been working at Wal-Mart for approximately a month (R.203: 117, 127). Earlier in the 
day, Palmer worked at Arby's from 10 am to 5 pm (R.203: 115, 127 On that night, 
Palmer worked at register twenty-three (R.203: 116). 
Palmer testified that she saw Clegg on that night between 7- 9:30 pm; and that she 
had seen him at the store on other occasions-including the night before (R.203: 114-15, 
116, 128, 133). Clegg bought approximately $350.00 worth of merchandise (R.203: 
116). Palmer testified that she recognized Exhibit 1 as a receipt from her register (R.203: 
117). The receipt verified that Clegg spent $344.66 (R.203: 117). 
Clegg purchased two items marked "mens duck" however, the scanner read the 
items five times and the other three had to be voided (R.203: 117-18). Palmer testified 
that Clegg "was talking to me the whole entire time, kind of confusing me and 
sidetracking me" (R.203: 118). Palmer also rang in a seat cover at $42.96 but the CSM 
came over to void that price because Clegg informed her the price was $19.96 (R.203: 
130). 
Palmer testified that Clegg handed her three items: a butane torch head , an item 
like a washer, and another item (R.203: 118-19, 121, 125). The items were not in 
packaging and Palmer asked Clegg about it (R.203: 119). Palmer testified that Clegg told 
her that "they were in a bulk display back in hardware. And I looked for the UPC 
because normally-most of the majority of time we have bulk things there's a UPC 
wrapped around. The UPC was not there" (Id.). Palmer testified that if there's not a 
UPC she will "take his word because at Wal-Mart we go with customer satisfaction, and I 
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can't-I didn't question him. I had a doubt, but I knew my CSM was right there-my 
customer service manager. I had a doubt, but I didn't question him" (Id.). 
Palmer did not call her CSM over at this time which was the appropriate person to 
contact with price questions (R.203: 120, 132). Although during her transaction with 
Clegg, the CSM came to the stand three times-to void the additional mens duck items and 
also to authorize the check that Clegg used to pay for the items (R.203: 120, 132). Palmer 
testified that she doesn't know why she did not call for the CSM and that it was her 
responsibility to do so and to do price checks (R.203: 133, 134). Yet despite her 
suspicions concerning the price of the three different items, she "didn't do anything about 
it" (R.203: 135-36). 
In regards to the price of the three items, Palmer indicated that Clegg "handed me 
a piece of paper that said $2.74 with the little UPC thing on the bottom-that piece of 
paper right there" (Exhibit 2) (R.203: 120, 125). Palmer testified that when Clegg handed 
her Exhibit 2 the following exchange occurred: "He said that, These three items I found 
in the bulk back in hardware, and these are the prices.' I said, 'Are you sure?' He said 
yes. Because that's the only kind of authority I have as a Wal-Mart associate is to say, 
'Are you sure'" (R.203: 120-21, 135). Palmer then scanned the piece of paper for the 
three items and set them aside so that she could put them in a smaller bag after when 
finished (R.203: 122). Palmer put the piece of paper by her deposit bag by the register 
(R.203: 123). 
Palmer testified that she did not know where the piece of paper went after Clegg 
left but that "It probably remained to my register because after Mr. Clegg tried to leave 
Wal-Mart my CSM-my customer service manager came over, shut off my light, and I had 
to go over there because he got caught by the door. Something dinged" (R.203: 123). 
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Palmer indicated that any testimony that the piece of paper was found inside of Clegg's 
basket was incorrect (R.203: 123). 
Palmer did not recall Marketti being present at the end of the table during her 
transaction with Clegg (R.203: 130). Palmer also testified that she could not recall Clegg 
ever informing her that he did not want certain items (R.203: 131). 
Palmer was called to the area of the loss prevention room to write a statement 
(R.203: 124). Palmer also testified that she was reprimanded "for letting somebody go 
through the line" (R.203: 124-25). She was also reprimanded for not having the CSM 
approve or override the third party business check presented by Clegg and because she 
failed to do a price check with her CSM on the items (R.203: 131, 134-35). As a 
consequence, she went through training again because she "wasn't trained properly" 
(R.203: 125). Palmer testified that after this training she would have behaved 
differently-"Been a little more careful. Mr. Clegg talked to me. He had me sidetracked. 
A little more-paid more attention. I was very sidetracked and nervous" (R.203: 125). 
She was nervous because her CSM "was watching me, and he just-he just kept talking to 
me. He was jittery and he just made me nervous" (R.203: 125). Palmer testified that 
Clegg "looked like he was under the influence of drugs" (R.203: 136). 
C. Testimony of Tyler Wilm 
On November 28, 2001, Tyler Wilm was employed at the Washington City Wal-
Mart store (R.203: 141). Wilm works as a loss prevention agent (Id.). Wilm met Clegg 
on that November date (R.203: 142). Wilm's attention was initially drawn to Clegg 
"because he was moving very briskly and wearing a very heavy coat" (Id.). 
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Wilm began to follow Clegg (R.203: 142). While Clegg was in the auto 
mechanics department, Wilm observed him from a distance of 15-20 feet (Id.). Wilm saw 
Clegg "select one pressure gauge from the side counter, look at it, open it up, put the 
pressure gauge in his cart and then place the empty package back on the display shelf 
(R.203: 142, 145). 
Wilm also observed Clegg in the hardware department (R.203: 143). Wilm 
"witnessed Mr. Clegg open up a butane torch, remove the torch head, place Ihe box along 
with the actual torch back on the... display shelf, and place the torch head into the bottom 
of his cart" (R.203: 143). 
Wilm followed Clegg to the check out stand (R.203: 143). Wilm testified as 
follows: "If I'm not mistaken, what I believe Mr. Clegg did was he presented all of his 
merchandise that he paid for first and then these two items [gauge and torch head] he 
placed on the belt last along with a tag-shelf label which he had selected also from the 
hardware department that he presented to the cashier" (R.203: 143). Wilm viewed the 
check out transaction "via overhead camera" from the loss prevention office and from 
approximately 20-22 feet behind Clegg (R.203: 143, 146, 147). 
Wilm testified that he saw-but not heard-a verbal exchange between Palmer and 
Clegg during check out (R.203: 144, 148). 
D. Testimony of Officer Chad Pectol 
Chad Pectol is a police officer with Washington City and St. George City (R.203: 
150). On November 28, 2001, he was dispatched to the Washington City Wal-Mart on a 
theft complaint (R.203: 151). Upon arrival, Pectol met with Palmer and Marketti (R.203: 
151). Clegg was also present in the security office (R.203: 152). Pectol detained 
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Clegg-possibly with hand-cuffs but did not read Clegg his Miranda warnings (R.203: 
152). 
Later Pectol explained to Clegg what had been reported by the store employees 
and questioned him about the tire gauge and other items (R.203: 152-53). Pectol testified 
that Clegg "said that at no time did he tell the cashier that those were his items nor to run 
them through the check stand" (R.203: 153). 
Pectol saw the $2.74 price tag (Exhibit 2) on the counter in the security office 
(R.203: 153). Pectol recognized Exhibit 6 as a photocopy of a photograph that was 
taken by the loss prevention employees (R.203: 154). Pectol said that Exhibit 3 and 
Exhibit 6 are different photographs but basically depict the same items (R.203: 154-55). 
Pectol did not review any of the store surveillance videotapes (R.203: 156). Pectol 
"vaguely" recalls Clegg asking the Wal-Mart employees to show him the surveillance 
tapes (R.203: 157). Pectol testified that he is usually able to view the tapes and that he is 
not sure why he did not look at the tapes (R.203: 157). 
Pectol testified from his report that Palmer told him that she had observed four 
items which had been removed from the packaging; and that Palmer had told him that she 
asked Clegg the price of the items and he indicated $2.70 (R.203: 158). 
Palmer never found out the original price of the torch, gauge, or washer (R.203: 
126). 
E. Testimony of Michael Clegg 
Michael Clegg testified that he went to Wal-Mart on November 28, 2001, to pick 
up some items for ABC Auto Sales "because it was Christmas time" (R.204: 166). Clegg 
had been to the store the previous evening and had purchased items from the Christmas 
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clearance sale (R.204: 167). Clegg called his friend, Al, and told him about the sale on 
car supplies (Id.). Clegg then "grabbed everything I wanted, put his stuff in holding. I 
didn't have enough money to put it in lay away. I told the girl I would be back the next 
night same time to pick it up" (Id.). 
However, when Clegg returned the next night, he learned that the items on hold 
had been restocked (R.204: 167). Clegg testified that Wal-Mart employees begin to look 
for the items "in five different departments" and that the area managers would check with 
him while he "was at the store for about three hours, it seemed like, walking around and 
doing some shopping" (R.204: 167-68). Clegg also looked for the restocked items 
(R.204: 168). Clegg testified that finally he was told that all of the items had been 
collected "so I went over and grabbed the rest of my stuff and we went through checkout" 
(Id.). 
Clegg testified that he is an inventor and was "trying to make a pressure deal for 
my chemical to pressure flush an engine without running it so that it won't be damaged. 
You know, at this time of night in the store there's never any one to help you. So I'm 
kind of a loud boisterous person, and I sat down on the floor with-opened up one of the 
torches and unscrewed it and looked at the little thread pattern, took it-you know, I was 
hoping someone would come up and say something to me, 'Hey, don't do that,' help me 
look for what I wanted" (R.204: 168). Clegg put the torch head in his cart (R 204: 184). 
Clegg testified that he did the same thing with the pressure gauge (R.204: 169). He took 
it out of the packaging so he could "see the threading" to see if it would help him adapt an 
old air conditioning unit (R.204: 185). Clegg determined, however, that the gauge did not 
match what he needed (R.204: 186). 
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While Clegg was looking at the torch he saw a "little fitting that had a valve on 
it-pressure valve you could turn on and off. It was perfect for what I wanted, but it 
wasn't in a package" (R.204: 169). Clegg took the valve and the tag that read "pro four 
voc, whateve(R. It's (inaudible) like Mexican for pressure valve, four ounce oil pressure 
valve" (R.204: 169). 
When it came time to check out, Clegg approached the same "girl" that checked 
him out the previous night (R.204: 169). Clegg testified that he thought she was cute, so 
he talked and flirted with her and she talked back (R.204: 169, 183). Clegg was with his 
friend, Steve, and they had two baskets "full of stuff' (R.204: 169). Steve unloaded the 
baskets while Clegg spoke with the cashier (R.204: 169-70). 
While Clegg was speaking with the cashier he grabbed the "stuff that I had taken 
out of the packages, and I handed them to her and I says, 'I don't want these. I took them 
out of the boxes, basically, and they need to be restocked. There was no one to help me'" 
(R.204: 170). Clegg testified that he did not think it was a big deal and that he was not 
going to steal from the store (R.204: 170). 
Clegg testified that she "continued to ring my stuff up" (R.204: 170). The cashier 
rang up a seat covers for $49.00 and Clegg told her that they were from a "big bulk 
section" and were on sale for $19.00 (R.204: 170). The cashier called her manager over 
and he asked her if she wanted a price check (Id.). Clegg testified that the cashier told 
him "no" and rang them up at the sale price (Id.). 
Clegg testified that he believed that the price card he handed Palmer corresponded 
to the sprinkler adapter and told Palmer this fact (R.204: 171, 178, 180, 199). The price 
on the tag was $2.74 (R.204: 181, 199). Clegg testified that Palmer responded, "That 
sounds like what it is" (R.204: 171). Palmer then rang up the item and his other items 
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(R.204: 172). Clegg testified that he was not aware that Palmer had rung up the torch 
head or gauge or that he had paid for them (R.204: 174, 178). Clegg testified that Palmer 
was "confused" in her testimony that he told her that the tag was the price of all three 
items-or alternatively that she lied to save her job (R.204: 186-87). 
Clegg testified that during checkout the CSM came to the register at least twice 
and that he would have been easy for Palmer to call if she had questions or needed help 
(R.204: 177). 
Clegg testified that he was at the store to do his business partner, Al Carlson, a 
favor (R.204: 177, 186). Al owns ABC Auto Sales (R.204: 178). Clegg paid for the 
items with one of Afs business checks (R.204: 178). 
Clegg testified that after he checked out, he was stopped by Marketti's boss 
(Mowry) before he got to the first set of exit doors and was still standing on the white tile 
floor (R.204: 172). He was told that maybe the cashier missed something (R.204: 199). 
Clegg testified that Mowry pulled the cart through the first set of doors to "get it out of 
the way" while he looked through the bags (R.204: 173). Clegg testified that they went 
through the bags twice (R.204: 193). Clegg testified that during the search, Marketti 
asked him where the torch head and pressure gauge were located and Clegg told them that 
he gave them back to Palmer because he did not want them (R.204: 174). 
Clegg also testified that he was informed that he had been overcharged for a 
package of three tire valves and that the employees "insisted I take a refund" (R.204: 175-
76). 
Clegg testified that he was detained and taken to a back room (R.204: 176). While 
he was detained he was questioned whether he knew Palmer (Id.). Clegg denied knowing 
her and that he had seen her the night before and thought she was cute (R.204: 176, 201). 
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Clegg testified that he was familiar with Chad Pectol (R.204: 202). Clegg asked 
Peetol, upon his arrival, to view the video "before writing me a ticket" (R.204: 202). 
F. Testimony of William (Bill) Mowry 
Bill Mowry testified that he is a district manager for Wal-Mart (R.204: 209). 
Mowry was at the Washington City store on November 28, 2001 (R.204: 210). Mowry 
was at the store on that night because two loss prevention employees were being trained 
(R.204: 227). Mowry first saw Clegg that evening in the hardware area around the 
butane balls or propane torches (R.204: 210). Mowry was wearing a Wal-Mart shirt with 
black or blue jeans ((R.204: 210, 227). 
Mowry-from a distance of approximately five feet-observed Clegg remove the tip 
from the butane torch and then place the remainder of the contents back in the box and set 
the box on the shelf (R.204: 211). Clegg walked off with the torch head (R.204: 232). 
Loss prevention employees-Wilm and Marketti-also observed Clegg the ends of the aisle 
(R.204: 211). Mowry testified that Clegg was not looking for any Wal-Mart associate but 
was "looking for someone to see if anyone would notice that he was taking the tip off the 
butane torch" (R.204: 211-12). Mowry did not make contact with Clegg at this time 
because "company policy doesn't allow me to contact customers" (R.204: 232). 
As Clegg was at the checkout stand, Mowry was able to observe the transaction 
from the clothing area and then from the aisle between cash registers 24 and 25 ((R.204: 
219-20). Mowry observed Clegg hand the price card (Exhibit 2) to Palmer (R.204: 225). 
Mowry could not hear the conversation between Clegg and Palmer (R.204: 225). 
After checkout, Mowry testified that Clegg was stopped at the grocery exit after he 
was past the EAS deactivators because "we wanted to recover the merchandise that he 
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had not paid for correctly" (R.204: 230, 213-14). Mowry also testified that "company 
policy dictates that we stop them as they're exiting the store" (R.204: 214). Mowry 
further testified that"Wal-Mart and most state laws that I've dealt with consider this [area 
between two sets of exit doors] to be a weather area, a protector from customers. There's 
no sale area here, and so that's considered outside the store" (R.204: 214-15). The loss 
prevention office is also located in this area near the exit (R.204: 215). 
After Clegg was stopped, he and his friend, Harrelson, were separated (R.204: 
215). Clegg was taken to the loss prevention office (Id.). Mowry testified that Clegg had 
one shopping cart (R.204: 216, 236). Mowry was initially in the office with Clegg but 
left to speak with Harrelson (R.204: 215, 233). 
Mowry and Marketti searched the shopping bags and located the pressure gauge, 
and the tip for the butane torch in the same bag (R.204: 217, 235). A plastic sprinkler 
part was also removed (Id.). Items in the cart were also itemized with the receipt 
(Exhibit 1) (R.204: 243). 
Mowry received the price tag (Exhibit 2) "from the cash register where Rainbow 
Palmer was working, and I advised the CSM to shut her register down so that we could 
talk to her and have her write a statement regarding this incident" (R.204: 220, 229). 
Mowry took the tag to the loss prevention office and showed it to Clegg (R.204: 221). 
Mowry testified that Clegg said it was "the shelf label for the items that he had 
purchased" (R.204: 221). Mowry indicated that the $2.74 price tag was for a 4 ounce 
bottle of PVC low voc cement (Id.). 
Mowry questioned Clegg and asked him "why he was taking those items, and he 
said that he had paid for them, and he denied that he had removed them out of the boxes. 
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He said he found them on the shelf (R.204: 217). Clegg also denied knowing the 
cashier, Palmer (R.204: 218). 
After this incident, Palmer was given a reprimand or a "verbal coaching" because 
"she mishandled the transaction" (R.204: 218, 234). Palmer had to retake the computer 
training segment as a result of the way she handled the transaction with Clegg (R.204: 
218,234). 
Wal-Mart has a price-matching policy and cashiers "have the right to override" the 
marked price to promote customer satisfaction (R.204: 218-19, 228). However, cashiers 
are not "supposed to ring up any item that does not have a UPC item listed without it 
being either price checked or checked to make sure it's the same item" (R.204: 219). If 
an item lacks a UPC, the cashier is supposed to contact the customer service manager 
(CSM) (R.204: 219). The cashiers are responsible for getting the correct price on 
unmarked items (R.204: 228). Accordingly, Palmer had the responsibility for ensuring 
that the gauge, sprinkler part, and butane tip were correctly priced (R.204: 228-29). 
Mowry testified that generally cashiers place items the individuals decide not to 
purchase either above the register or on the floor on the right-hand side (R.204: 222). 
Mowry indicated that the cashiers are trained not to put the items underneath the cash 
register, where hangers and trash are placed (R.204: 222-23). 
Mowry testified that he could re-sell the butane torch tip but not the pressure gauge 
(R.204: 225-26). Mowry indicated that Wal-Mart may, or may not, get reimbursed for 
items that cannot be resold (R.204: 226). The retail price for the pressure gauge was 
$14.96 (Id.). The price of the butane torch box was $12.97 (Id.). The price of the 
sprinkler part was approximately $3.70 (Id.). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
One, Clegg asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 
committed the crime of theft by deception in that his conduct does not satisfy the statutory 
definition of deception; and that it was plain error for the trial court to submit this case to 
the jury. Alternatively, Clegg asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move 
for a directed verdict or an arrest of judgment due to the insufficient evidence presented 
by the State. 
Two, Clegg asserts that the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct 
the jury on the entire statutory definition of theft by deception-including the statutory 
defense found in subsection (2)-which is set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405. 
Alternatively, Clegg asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the 
jury be so instructed.. 
Three, Clegg asserts that the trial court committed plain error in highlighting to the 
jury his wife's employment at the same Wal-Mart where the theft allegedly occurred and 
in admonishing the defendant about his behavior in front of the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT CLEGG 
COMMITTED THE CRIME OF THEFT BY DECEPTION 
Clegg asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed the 
crime of theft by deception and that it was plain error for the trial court to submit this case 
to the jury. An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can 
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demonstrate that... 'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^11, 10 P.3d 
346 (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. Lopez, 886 
P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)). Alternatively, Clegg asserts that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict or an arrest of judgment due to the 
insufficient evidence presented by the State. 
A. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Submitting the Case to the Jury 
Clegg asserts that this evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that he 
committed the crime of theft by deception. Although this issue was not preserved below, 
Clegg asserts that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court 
committed plain error in submitting the case to the jury. 
To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a defendant must 
demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged...." Holgate, 2000 UT 71 at |17. "To demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 
1J14, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 
1991)). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence i s sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he or she was convicted."' Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^fl8 (quoting State 
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v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Then the defendant must show "that the 
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the 
case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at [^17. 
The purpose of review under a plain error standard is to "avoid injustice," Holgate, 
2000 UT 74 at Tfl3 (quoting State v. Eldridge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah App. 1989). The 
plain error standard also "enables the appellate court to 'balance the need for procedural 
regularity with the demands of fairness.5'" Id. (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 
n.12 (Utah 1989)). Fundamental fairness is "the touchstone of due process." State v. 
Morgan, 2001 UT 87,115, 34 P.3d 767. 
"Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 sets for the statutory definition of theft by 
deception." State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992). " Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 reads: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to 
deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated 
commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to 
a class or group.1 
In this case, without objection, the jury was only instructed on the language of 
Subsection (1). Clegg asserts that the trial court committed plain error, and that trial counsel 
was ineffective, in failing to instruct the jury as to the complete statutory definition of theft 
by deception-including Subsection (2). This issue will be addressed in Point II of 
Appellant's brief. 
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In addition, Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-401(5) provides the statutory definition of 
"deception" and lists five different circumstances in which deception may be found for 
purposes of establishing theft by deception. Only subsection (5)(a) is applicable here: 
Deception occurs when an individual "creates or confirms by words or conduct an 
impression of law or fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and 
that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction."2 
"[T]hree separate components are imbedded" in the "by deception" element of the 
theft by deception statute: "(1) that defendant's acts satisfied the statutory definition of 
deception, (2) that the deception occurred contemporaneously with the transaction in 
question, and (3) that the victim relied upon the deception, at least to some extent, in 
parting with the property." LeFevre, 825 P.2d at 685. Clegg asserts that his act does not 
satisfy the statutory definition of deception. Clegg also asserts that there was no reliance 
on the part of the victim. 
The statutory definition of deception includes not only the definition of 
"deception" set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-40 l(5)(a) but also includes the 
statutory definition or defense set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405(2) which 
states what theft by deception is not: "Theft by deception does not occur, however, when 
there is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by 
statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. 'Puffing' means 
an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the 
public or to a class or group." 
2This is essentially the definition of "deception" which was given to the jury in 
Instruction 14-D(R.103). 
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Specifically, Clegg asserts the following: One, that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that any false communication he made or implied to the cashier as to the price of 
the three items at issue is "likely to affect" her judgment. Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
401(5)(a). Two, that his statements were "unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the 
group addressed"—which in this case is Wal-Mart cashiers; and that therefore, according 
to the plain language of the theft by deception statute, his actions do not-as a matter of 
law-constitute the crime of theft by deception . Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405(2). 
Clegg has marshaled the evidence in his statement of facts. However, Clegg will 
also marshal the evidence here as necessary to the argument. Clegg went to the 
Washington Wal-Mart on November 28, 2001 (R.203: 57, 142; 204: 210). Clegg 
purchased $344.00 worth of goods from the store (R.203: 65, 117). Clegg removed a 
butane torch head from its package (R.203: 60-61, 119, 143; 204: 211, 232). Clegg also 
removed a pressure gauge from its package (R.203: 63, 119, 142). Clegg also had a 
sprinkler adapter that did not have any packaging (R.203: 64, 119 ). The items also had 
no UPC barcode (R.203: 119). 
At checkout, the items and a $2.74 price tag was presented to the cashier by Clegg 
(R.203: 118-19, 121, 125; 204: 225). The price card did not correspond to any of the 
three items (R.203: 68; 204: 221). The cashier, Rainbow Palmer, and other employees 
(Marketti) testified that Clegg indicated that the price card corresponded to the three 
items at issue (R.203: 66, 92,120-21, 35). The cashier rang up the torch head, the 
pressure gauge, and a sprinkler adapter at $2.74 each under the SKU number of the price 
card (R.203: 109). The actual price of the torch head was $12.97 (R.203: 63; 204: 226). 
The price of the pressure gauge was $14.96 (R.203: 63; 204: 226). The price of the 
sprinkler adapter was approximately $3.70 (R.204: 226). 
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A conversation between Clegg and Palmer occurred during the check out 
transaction (R.203: 87-88, 118, 144, 148). Marketti, a loss prevention trainer, testified 
that he felt that Clegg was trying to confuse Palmer (R.203: 91). At the time of the 
transaction, Palmer was working two jobs and had been employed by Wal-Mart 
approximately one month (R.203: 117, 127). Palmer testified that Clegg had her 
sidetracked and nervous (R.203: 118, 125). 
Palmer's CSM (customer service manager) came to her cashier three times during 
the transaction with Clegg to void items with the wrong price, etc. and to approve the 
third party business check that was presented by Clegg for payment of the goods R.203: 
120, 132). The CSM was the person Palmer was trained to contact with price questions 
(R.203: 120, 132). Palmer did not call for her CSM about the price of the items although 
she had "doubts" about the price Clegg quoted (R.203: 119). Palmer testified that it was 
her responsibility to call for the CSM with price questions and that it was her 
responsibility to do so and to do price checks (R.203: 133, 134). Yet despite Palmer's 
suspicions concerning the three items, she "didn't do anything about it" (R.203: 135-36). 
William Mowry, the district manager, also testified that the cashier is responsible 
for getting the correct price on unmarked items (R.204: 228). If an item lacks a UPC 
barcode, the cashier is supposed to contact the CSM (R.204: 219). Under Wal-Mart's 
price-matching policy, cashiers also "have the right to override" the marked price to 
promote customer satisfaction (R.204: 218-19, 228). However, cashiers are not 
"supposed to ring up any item that does not have a UPC item listed without it being either 
price checked or checked to make sure it's the same item (R.204: 219). 
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Palmer and Mowry testified that Palmer was given a reprimand or coaching for 
mishandling the transaction (R.203: 124-25; 204: 218, 234). As a result, Palmer had to 
retake the computer training (R.203: 125; 204: 218, 234). 
Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to establish that any false 
communication he made or implied to the cashier as to the price of the three items at issue 
is "likely to affect" her judgment. Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-40 l(5)(a). Palmer had 
been specifically trained that getting the correct pricing was her responsibility as a 
cashier. Palmer also knew that it was her responsibility to call for the CSM with price 
questions and that it was her responsibility to do so and to do price checks (R.203: 133, 
134). Yet despite Palmer's suspicions concerning the three items and their correct price, 
she "didn't do anything about it" (R.203: 135-36). Moreover, Palmer had contacted the 
CSM with other questions during the transaction with Clegg. Accordinlgy, Clegg asserts 
that the evidence was insufficient to establish that his quote of the wrong price for the 
three items was not likely to affect her judgment. Palmer made a choice not to follow 
procedures, not to contact her CSM, and not to do a price check on the three items. Clegg 
simply made an offer of a price which was accepted by the cashier. 
Additionally, Clegg's statements were "unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the 
group addressed"-which in this case is Wal-Mart cashiers; and that therefore, according 
to the plain language of the theft by deception statute, his actions do not-as a matter of 
law-constitute the crime of theft by deception . Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405(2). 
Both Palmer and Mowry, the district manager testified that price checking was the 
responsibility of the cashier. In addition, Mowry testified that if an item lacks a UPC 
barcode, the cashier is supposed to contact the CSM (R.204: 219). Under Wal-Mart's 
price-matching policy, cashiers also "have the right to override" the marked price to 
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promote customer satisfaction (R.204: 218-19, 228). However, cashiers are not supposed 
to ring up any item that does not have a UPC item listed without it being either price 
checked or checked to make sure it's the same item (R.204: 219). Accordingly, Clegg's 
statements as to the price of the three items were "unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in 
the group addressed" because Wal-Mart cashiers-including Palmer-were specifically 
trained on their responsibilities in regards to pricing. 
Moreover, Clegg asserts that Palmer's decision to accept the price tag as the 
correct price for the items was a choice made with full knowledge of her responsibilities 
as a cashier and that it was not the result of any reliance on any deceptive communication 
from Clegg. One, it is not logical that one price tag would accurately reflect the correct 
price of three different items. Two, Palmer testified that she was trained to contact her 
CSM with price questions and that it was her responsibility to ensure that price checks are 
performed (R. 203: 120, 132). Three, Palmer testified that she had "serious doubts" about 
the price Clegg quoted yet she failed to perform any price check or even to contact her 
CSM (R. 203: 119). She simply "didn't do anything about it" (R. 203: 135-36). Clegg 
should not be convicted of theft by deception because the cashier failed to perform her 
known duties and Wal-Mart suffered a loss of 20-30 dollars as a result. 
Clegg asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence as a matter of law 
which establishes that he committed the crime of theft by deception. Clegg also asserts 
that the evidentiary defect-namely that his conduct satisfied the statutory definition of 
deception-was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to submit this case to 
the jury. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at Tfl7. But for this error, Clegg would not have been 
convicted. 
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B. Alternatively, Trial Counsel's Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict 
Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
Clegg's trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness for failing to move for a directed verdict. Moreover, this 
deficient performance affected the outcome of the trial. 
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for 
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a 
conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); See also Tillman 
v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U S . 1050, 114 S.Ct. 706, 126 
L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to move to 
dismiss where the evidence to convict was sufficient)). 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden 
to show that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, 
which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. As stated above, the 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to submit this case to the jury. Accordingly, 
trial counsel's performance was deficient for failing to move for a directed verdict under 
the reasoning set forth Reyes. But for this failure, this case would not have been 
submitted to the jury and Clegg would not have been convicted of theft by deception. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR, AND TRIAL 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON THE COMPLETE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF THEFT BY DECEPTION 
Clegg asserts that the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury 
on the entire statutory definition of theft by deception-including the statutory defense 
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found in subsection (2)-which is set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405. Because 
this issue was not raised in the trial court, this Court will review it for obvious and 
harmful error. State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103, \5, 37 P.3d 1099. 
Alternatively, Clegg asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request 
that the jury be instructed on the entire statutory definition of theft by deception-which 
included the defense set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405(2). A claim of 
ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990). Nonetheless, "ineffective assistance of counsel falls on the end of 
the spectrum subject to de novo review of the ultimate legal question of whether the 
defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). To establish a 
claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: "(1) that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial 
would probably have been different but for counsel's error." Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
"Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 sets for the statutory definition of theft by 
deception." State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992). " Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 reads: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to 
deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated 
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commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to 
a class or group. 
In this case the jury was instructed properly as to the elements set forth in subsection 1 
(Jury Instruction 14-A - (R.100). The jury was also properly instructed on the applicable 
definition of "deception" set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-40 l(5)(a). However, 
the jury was not instructed on the statutory defense which is included in the statutory 
definition of theft by deception and is set forth in subsection (2) of the theft by deception 
statute. Clegg asserts that without an instruction on the defense set forth in subsection 
(2), the jury instructions were incomplete. 
This Court addressed this same issue in State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15 (Utah App. 
1996). This Court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request 
that the jury be instructed as to the statutory defenses to theft by deception because the 
defendant, on appeal, "made no attempt to show this court how the outcome of the trial 
would have been different had the instructions been submitted to the jury." Vigil, 922 
P.2d at 29. This Court also concluded that defendant's plain error challenge in regards to 
the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the statutory defenses failed because the 
error would not have been obvious to the trial court because "defendant's defense at trial 
was apparently not based on the statutory defenses." Vigil, 922 P.2d at 29. 
In this case, however, Clegg asserts that it was obvious error for the trial court not 
to instruct the jury as to the entire statutory definition of theft by deception, which 
includes the defense set forth in subsection (2). Clegg's defense which was argued to the 
jury in the presence of Judge Shumate falls squarely within the language of subsection (2) 
which sets forth circumstances that do not constitute theft by deception. 
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Specifically, Clegg argued that he made an offer on the price when the price card 
was presented to the cashier; and that offer was accepted by the cashier (R.204: 257-59). 
The cashier did not have to take Clegg's word for the value of the items. In fact she had 
been specifically trained not to do so but failed in her responsibility to do a price check. 
She could not have reasonably relied on Clegg's word because she-and the other Wal-
Mart cashiers-had been trained not to rely on customer's statements as to the price of 
unmarked items. Accordingly, Clegg's statements were "puffing" under the statute and 
were "statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed." Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-405(2). Accordingly, because Clegg's defense was implicitly 
based on the statutory defense of subsection (2), Clegg asserts that the trial court's error 
in failing to instruct the jury on this defense was obvious. 
Moreover, this error should have been even more obvious to the trial court because 
the defense set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405(2)-unlike other affirmative 
defenses to theft-is actually set forth as part of the statutory definition of the offense. 
Moreover, this Court has previously concluded that Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 in 
its entirety contains the statutory definition of theft by deception. See, State v. LeFevre, 
825 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Accordingly, 
the trial court had notice that subsection (2) is part of the theft by deception statute in that 
it statutory sets forth specific instances which do not constitute theft by deception. 
Similarly, Clegg asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request 
that the jury be instructed on the entire statutory definition of theft by deception including 
its defense set forth in subsection (2). To satisfy the first prong of the Stricklandtest, 
Clegg must show that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; State v. Tennyson, 850 
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P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993). To meet this prong, defendants "must prove that 
specific, identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). For the same 
reasons, the trial court committed obvious error in failing to so instruct the jury, counsel's 
performance was demonstrably deficient. Under the Sixth Amendment criminal 
defendants are entitled to legal representation and "assistance by a competent member of 
the Bar, who shows a willingness to identify himself with the interests of the accused and 
present such defenses as are available under the law." State v. Crestani, 111 P-2d 1085 
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976). Clegg 
asserts that his counsel was deficient because of his failure to request that the jury be 
specifically instructed on the defense set forth in subsection (2) which is part of the 
statutory definition of theft by deception and which was applicable to the facts of this 
case. 
Clegg was prejudiced by the trial court's obvious error and his counsel's deficient 
performance and that had the jury been instructed as to the complete statutory definition 
of theft by deception there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. Clegg 
asserts that his statements were "unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group 
addressed"-which in this case is Wal-Mart cashiers; and that therefore, according to the 
plain language of the theft by deception statute, his actions do not-as a matter of 
law-constitute the crime of theft by deception . Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405(2). 
Both Palmer, the cashier, and Mowry, the district manager testified that price checking 
was the responsibility of the cashier. In addition, Mowry testified that if an item lacks a 
UPC barcode, the cashier is supposed to contact the CSM (R.204: 219). Under Wal-
Mart's price-matching policy, cashiers also "have the right to override" the marked price 
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to promote customer satisfaction (R.204: 218-19, 228). However, cashiers are not 
"supposed to ring up any item that does not have a UPC item listed without it being either 
price checked or checked to make sure it's the same item (R.204: 219). Accordingly, 
Clegg's statements as to the price of the three items were "unlikely to deceive ordinary 
persons in the group addressed" because Wal-Mart cashiers-including Palmer-were 
specifically trained on their responsibilities in regards to pricing. Clegg asserts that had 
the jury known that statements that are unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group 
addressed do not constitute theft by deception, there was a reasonable likelihood that he 
would have been acquitted. 
Accordingly, Clegg requests that this Court conclude that the trial court committed 
plain error, and trial counsel was ineffective, in failing to instruct the jury as to the 
complete statutory definition of theft by deception and its specific statutory defense set 
forth in subsection (2). 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN HIS 
COMMENTS TO THE JURY CONCERNING HIS WIFE'S EMPLOYMENT 
AND IN ADMONISHING THE DEFENDANT IN FRONT OF THE JURY 
Clegg asserts that the trial court committed plain error in highlighting to the jury 
his wife's employment at the same Wal-Mart where the theft allegedly occurred and in 
admonishing the defendant about his behavior in front of the jury. This issue was not 
preserved but should be reviewed for obvious and harmful error. State v. Parker, 2000 
UT51,ffij6-7,4P.3d778. 
"A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a neutral and detached magistrate." 
People v. Conyers, 194 Mich. App. 395, 398, 487 N.W.2d 787, — (1992). "A trial court 
pierces the veil of judicial impartiality if the court's comments or conduct unduly bias or 
influence the jury, thus preventing the defendant from receiving a fair and impartial trial. 
People v. Paquette, 214 Mich. App. 336, 340, 543 N.W.2d 342, — 1995), cert, denied, 
557 N.W.2d 315 (Mich. 1996). Clegg asserts that the trial court's comments at the very 
least created the appearance of bias in favor of the alleged victim and against him which 
influenced the jury and prevented him from receiving a fair and impartial trial. 
A. The Trial Court Committed Obvious Error in Highlighting to the Jury His 
Wife's Employment at the Same Wal-Mart where the Theft Allegedly Occurred. 
During jury selection on the first day of trial, the following exchange occurred: 
The Court: Do any of you work for Wal-Mart Corporation, either at stores or at 
the distribution center? If you do would you raise your hand? All 
right, I've got a hand. M'am, what's your name? 
Ms. Hyatt: Crystal Hyatt. 
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The Court: All right. Ms. Hyatt, I'm going to excuse you right now, and it's not 
unusual. My wife also works for Wal-Mart. She's a pharmacist for 
them right now. But Wal-Mart is involved in this case and so we're 
excusing anybody who's from Wal-Mart. Thank you, Ms. Hyatt. 
You can go 
(R.203: 8-9).3 In addition, at the end of the first day of trial, Judge Shumate admonished 
the jurors as to their responsibilities as jurors outside the courtroom during the pendency 
of the trial (R.203: 159-60). During his admonishments, Judge Shumate made the 
following statement: 
Do any of you have a crying need to go to the Wal-Mart in Washington 
today? I have to go there and pick up my wife from work, but I'm not going to try 
to learn about the case there; I promise you. Please don't do that yourselves 
(R.203: 160). Clegg asserts that these comments were unnecessary and inappropriate 
because they gave the jury the impression that the court was not "neutral and detached" 
but was instead aligned with the purported victim, Wal-Mart, due to his wife's 
relationship with the store. 
Generally Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires recusal in cases 
where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The United States 
Supreme Court in its analysis of the federal counterpart to this rule held that this section 
"can be violated... based on an appearance of partiality, even though the judge was not 
conscious of the circumstances creating the appearance of impropriety." Liljeberg v. 
3Prior to the first day of the preliminary hearing on August 12, 2002, Judge Shumate 
made the following statement: "Counsel, we all know that my wife works for Wal-Mart. It's 
not a problem, is it?" (R. 198: 3). Clegg's counsel at the time, Brenda Whiteley, stated "That 
is not a problem for me, your Honor" (Id.). 
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Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2201, 100 L.Ed.2d 
855 (1988). See also, American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communication Corp., 
939 P.2d 185, 195 (Utah App. 1997). Clegg asserts that the basic test cited by this Court 
in reviewing the trial court's denial of a recusal motion is: "Would a reasonable person, 
knowing all the facts, conclude that the trial judge's impartiality could reasonably be 
questioned." American Rural Cellular, 939 P.2d at 195 (quoting United States v. 
Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Ci(R.1992)). 
Clegg is not arguing here that the trial court committed plain error in failing to 
recuse himself because his wife worked at the Wal-Mart store. However, Clegg does 
assert that the trial court erred in highlighting his family's connection to Wal-Mart in his 
comments to the jury. Informing the jury of such a connection between the court and the 
purported victim at the very least created "an appearance of partiality" and put the court 
in the position where a reasonable person could reasonably question his impartiality. 
Moreover, the impropriety of commenting on his wife's employment at Wal-Mart should 
have been patently obvious to the trial court. Indeed, Judge Shumate excused a potential 
juror who was employed at the Wal-Mart. 
B. The Trial Court Committed Obvious Error in Admonishing the Defendant about 
His Behavior in Front of the Jury 
During the trial, Clegg would occasionally offer verbal interjections during the 
testimony of other witnesses and also verbally disagreed with his counsel at times. In 
response, Judge Shumate, towards the end of trial, stopped the proceedings and made the 
following statement in the presence of the jury: 
Give me just a minute. Mr.Clegg, I have patiently put up with your unusual 
behavior, your untoward behavior, your outbursts, your fighting with your 
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Counsel, the miserable display that you have put on while seated there at Counsel 
table. You will now sit quietly and still for the rest of these proceedings. Don't 
make any noises. Don't move your arms or hands. Don't move your head. Be 
still 
(R.204: 241). Clegg asserts that the trial court's admonishment in the presence of the jury 
was inappropriate and demonstrated bias against him which influenced the jury. 
In State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, 37 P.3d 1180, this Court examined a similar 
issue. In Tueller, the trial court admonished the defendant in the jury's presence about 
signaling a witness. 2001 UT App 317 at \ 12. This Court concluded that the trial judge 
acted within his discretion in responding to events in his courtroom because if the trial 
court noticed the hand movements, the jury probably observed them too. Clegg asserts 
that in this case, the trial courts admonishment went far beyond an admonishment against 
physical movements. Judge Shumate's comments constituted a personal attack against 
Clegg that demonstrated bias against him. 
Clegg also asserts that the impropriety of making such disparaging comments in 
front of the jury should have been obvious to the trial court. The trial court is in an 
"advantaged position... to determine the impact of events occurring in the courtroom on 
the total proceedings." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, \ 20, 999 P.2d 7 (citation omitted). 
However, the trial court also has to recognize his role as a "neutral and detached 
magistrate." Conyers, 194 Mich. App. at 398. Moreover, Canon 1 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct reads in part: "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable 
in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and 
shall personally observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence 
of the judiciary will be preserved." Similarly, Canon 2(A) of the same code reads: "A 
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judge shall respect and comply with the law and should exhibit conduct that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Clegg accordingly 
asserts that the trial court's error in inappropriately admonishing and attacking him in the 
presence of the jury was obvious because it did not promote judicial impartiality. 
C. Clegg was Prejudiced by the Trial Court's Comments Made to, and in the 
Presence of, the Jury 
In reviewing an issue under the plain error standard, this Court will only reverse if 
the obvious error was also harmful. State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51,17, 4 P.3d 778. For an 
error to be harmful the defendant must establish that absent the error there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. In Parker, the defendant was tried for 
murder for inflicting multiple stab wounds on the victim with a five inch knife. 2000 UT 
51 at Yf 2, 4. The trial court during voir dire engaged in a discussion with a potential 
juror regarding knives. 2000 UT 51 at f^ 4. The trial court showed the jury his own 
pocket knife and commented that his knife was "probably as thick a pocket knife that a 
fellow really ought to carry." Id. This Court concluded that the judge's comment was not 
proper but not harmful or prejudicial because "any improper impressions created by the 
trial judge's comments" were remedied by the court's instruction to the jury that they "not 
be influenced by any statement which they may have interpreted as indicating the trial 
court's views on the evidence." 2000 UT 51 at ffif 6, 8. 
In this case the jury was similarly instructed about their role as fact finders and that 
they should not interpret any statements or rulings of the court as an indication that the 
court has an opinion as to the facts or evidence (R.95). However, this case differs from 
that of Parker in that the trial courts comments went not to his opinion as to the evidence 
in the case but as to his opinion as to the parties. The trial court's comments aligned 
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himself with the purported victim by highlighting to the jury his wife's employment with 
the victim. The trial court's comments also maligned the defendant by attacking him for 
his perceived behavior in the presence of the jury. 
The California Supreme Court has stated that "The propriety and prejudicial effect 
of a particular comment are judged by both its content and by the circumstances in which 
it was made." People v. Melton, 44 Cal.3d 713, 735, 750 P.2d 741, — (Cal.), cert, 
denied, 488 U.S. 934, 109 S.Ct. 329, 102 L.Ed.2d 346 (1988). Clegg asserts that an 
examination of both the content of the statements and the circumstances highlights the 
prejudicial effect of the trial court's statements. The content of Judge Shumate's 
comments to the jury concerning his wife's employment at Wal-Mart highlighted a 
relationship between himself and the purported victim-his wife's employer. Furthermore, 
the content of his admonishment to the defendant highlighted the disdain and frustration 
the trial court felt towards him. Additionally, the circumstances of these statement also 
added to the prejudicial effect of the statements. The trial lasted two days. Except for the 
defendant and one police officer all of the witnesses were, or had been, employees of 
Wal-Mart. During jury selection-prior to the testimony of the Wal-Mart employees-the 
judge's positive relationship because of his wife's employment with Wal-Mart was 
highlighted to the jury. Moreover, the jury was reminded of this relationship at the end of 
the first day of trial. In addition, the judge's disparaging comments towards the defendant 
were made towards the conclusion of the trial thus highlighting his disdain and frustration 
with the defendant to the jury. 
Finally, Clegg has already established that the evidence was insufficient. He 
asserts here that the State's case was bolstered by the trial court's comments and that 
absent those comments there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. 
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Accordingly, he asks that this Court conclude that the trial court's improper statements 
were also harmful. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Clegg requests that this Court reverse his conviction for theft by deception because 
the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed the crime. Alternatively, he 
asks that this Court reverse his conviction because the jury was not instructed on the 
complete statutory definition of theft by deception and because the trial court's comments 
concerning his wife's employment, and his admonishment of the defendant in front of the 
jury, were improper and prejudicial. 
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